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Construction Law
by Frank 0. Brown Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article focuses on noteworthy construction law decisions by
Georgia appellate courts between June 1, 2008 and May 31, 2009, and
significant construction-related Georgia legislation and regulations
during the same period.1

II.
A.

MECHANICS' AND MATERIALMEN'S LIENS

Notice to Contractor

As a condition to pursuing lien rights, section 44-14-361.5(a) of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) 2 requires any mechanic
or materialman not in privity with the contractor (such as a second-tier
subcontractor or supplier to a subcontractor) to notify the contractor and
the property owner or its agent that the mechanic or materialman is
providing services or materials to the property.3 That notice, called a
"Notice to Contractor," must be in writing, contain specified information,
and be given within thirty days from the later of the first delivery of
services or materials or the filing of a Notice of Commencement by the
contractor, the property owner, or an agent.4

* Shareholder in the firm ofWeissman, Nowack, Curry & Wilco, P.C., Atlanta, Georgia.
General Counsel, Greater Atlanta Home Builders Association, Inc., The Housing Institute,
Inc., and HomeAid Atlanta, Inc. Rhodes College (B.A., 1976); Emory University School of
Law (J.D., 1979). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. For analysis of Georgia construction law during the prior survey period, see Frank
0. Brown Jr., Construction Law, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw, 60 MERCER L. REV. 59
(2008).
2. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(a) (2002 & Supp. 2009).
3. Id.
4. Id.
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Significantly, under the express terms of O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(a), the
obligation to give a Notice to Contractor applies when a Notice of
Commencement has been filed.5 At issue in Rey Coliman Contractors,
Inc. v. PCL Construction Services, Inc.6 was whether that obligation
existed if the Notice of Commencement, although filed, was not posted
on the project as also required by O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(a).7 The
Georgia Court of Appeals said that the obligation to give the Notice to
Contractor still existed because O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(a) did not
expressly limit the Notice to Contractor obligation to projects on which
a Notice of Commencement had been posted.'
Rey Coliman is also an important reminder of two other points. First,
mechanics' and materialmen's lien laws are strictly construed in favor
of property owners and against lien claimants.9 Thus, the blanket
assertion, frequently seen in motions and even opinions on the subject,
that mechanics' and materialmen's lien laws are strictly construed is
overly broad. Second, as was the case in Rey Coliman, the validity of
mechanics and materialmen's liens may be affirmatively challenged by
a suit for declaratory judgment.1 °
Under O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(b)," a Notice of Commencement must
include the "name and address of the true owner of the property" and a
"legal description of the property." 2 The Notice of Commencement
under review in Harris Ventures, Inc. v. Mallory & Evans, Inc.13
misidentified the true property owner as "EHCA John's Creek, LLC,"
rather than "EHCA Dunwoody, LLC," and did not include a legal
description. 4 The court of appeals held that these errors rendered the
Notice of Commencement legally deficient, thereby excusing the
subcontractor from giving a Notice to Contractor as a condition to its
pursuit of lien rights. 5
In Beacon Medical Products, LLC v. Travelers Casualty & Surety Co.
of America, 6 the question was whether a supplier to a subcontractor
had to give a Notice to Contractor even though the Notice of Commence-

5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

Id.
296 Ga. App. 892, 676 S.E.2d 299 (2009).
Id. at 892, 676 S.E.2d at 299.
Id. at 896, 676 S.E.2d at 301.
Id.
Id. at 892, 676 S.E.2d at 299.
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(b) (2002 & Supp. 2009).
Id.
291 Ga. App. 843, 662 S.E.2d 874 (2008).
Id. at 843-44, 662 S.E.2d at 874-75.
Id. at 845, 662 S.E.2d at 875-76.
292 Ga. App. 617, 665 S.E.2d 710 (2008).

2009]

CONSTRUCTION LAW

ment had not been filed within the fifteen-day filing period provided by
O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(b).17 In relevant part, this section states that
"[n]ot later than [fifteen] days after the contractor physically commences
work on the property, a Notice of Commencement shall be filed.""8 The
court of appeals held that the supplier was still required to give a Notice
to Contractor 19 because O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(a) does not expressly
excuse that notice when the Notice of Commencement is filed after the
fifteen-day period2" and because, in this case, the Notice of Commencement was filed almost four months before the supplier began providing
materials for the project.2"
B.

Claim of Lien

D.C. Ecker Construction, Inc. v. Ponce Investment, LLC2 2 shows that
there are limits to the construction of mechanics' and materialmen's
liens against the lien claimant. The plaintiff contractor in D.C. Ecker
sued the property owner to foreclose a mechanics' and materialmen's
lien. The owner filed a motion to dismiss (not a motion for summary
judgment) because the lien stated that the contractor's claim became due
on a date more than three months before the lien was filed, and the lien
was filed within three months of the date when the contractor provided
services to the owner.23
On appeal, the contractor argued that "the trial court should not have
construed the lien against it at the motion to dismiss stage."24 The
court of appeals agreed.2" The court's opinion reflects two principal
reasons for its decision. First, "[t]he crucial date in determining the
validity of a lien is the date the material or labor is last provided, not
the date the claim is due."2" Second, because of the first reason, there
was a set of facts that the plaintiff could prove in support of its claim.27
Consequently,
the court held that granting the motion to dismiss was
8
error.2

17. Id. at 621, 665 S.E.2d at 713.
18. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.5(b).
19. Beacon Medical, 292 Ga. App. at 623, 665 S.E.2d at 714-15.

20. Id. at 621, 665 S.E.2d at 713.
21. Id. at 622, 665 S.E.2d at 714.
22. 294 Ga. App. 833, 670 S.E.2d 526 (2008).
23. Id. at 833-34, 670 S.E.2d at 527.

24. Id. at 835, 670 S.E.2d at 528.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.

28. Id.
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The frequent use of "due date" language on mechanics' and materialmen's liens arises from the instruction to "specify the date the claim was
due" that is part of the statutory lien form in O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1
(a)(2).29 Because D.C. Ecker and other Georgia appellate decisions state
that the last day of labor or material controls over the due date,30 it is
unfortunate that the statute does not simply use the former terminology.
A recent amendment to that code section, which became effective March
31, 2009, provides the following clarifying instruction: "specify the date
the claim was due, which is the same as the last date the labor, services,
or materials were supplied to the premises."3 '
III. COLLATERAL AGREEMENTS
The Georgia Court of Appeals decision in Bolers v. Noir Enterprises,
Inc.3 2 is a reminder that an ordinary merger clause may be insufficient
to eliminate a previously existing collateral agreement and that
additional language may be required to accomplish that purpose. The
parties, a homebuilder and homeowners, first entered into a written
construction management contract relating to the construction of a
house. Later, they entered into a written construction contract relating
to the same house. 3 The latter construction contract included a
standard merger clause stating that it "supersedes any and all previous
agreements, either oral or in writing, between the parties with respect
to the subject matter of the agreement."'
It also stated that all
changes had to be in writing and signed by the parties to be valid.35
The builder contended that, in between the written management
contract and the written construction contract, the parties had entered
into an oral management contract for additional compensation.3"
On appeal, the court of appeals stated that, although the builder was
bound by the merger clause in the written construction contract, an oral
agreement between the parties that did not vary the terms of the written
construction contract was not necessarily defeated by the merger clause
and might be enforceable as a collateral agreement.3 7 The court held

29. O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(a)(2) (2002 & Supp. 2009).
30. See, e.g., D.C. Ecker, 294 Ga. App. at 835, 670 S.E.2d at 528; Cent. Atlanta Tractor
Sales v. Athena Dev., LLC, 289 Ga. App. 355, 358, 657 S.E.2d 290, 293 (2008).
31. 2008 Ga. Laws 1063, 1065 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. § 44-14-361.1(aX2)
(Supp. 2009)).
32. 297 Ga. App. 435, 677 S.E.2d 338 (2009).
33. Id. at 436, 677 S.E.2d at 340.
34. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
35. Id.
36. Id. at 439, 677 S.E.2d at 342.
37. Id.
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that there were jury questions about the existence and terms of the
alleged oral management agreement, and therefore, summary judgment
on that claim was inappropriate. 38
V.

DAMAGES LIMITATIONS

In Precision Planning, Inc. v. Richmark Communities, Inc.,39 the
Georgia Court of Appeals addressed the enforceability of a provision in
a contract between a residential developer and an architect that limited
the architect's liability to the developer for the architect's errors or
professional negligence to the greater of $50,000 or the architect's fee.
The developer had hired the architect to design a retaining wall, which
thereafter failed. The architect moved for partial summary judgment to
limit its liability to the $50,000 or fee cap. The trial court denied the
motion, finding the damages limitation void as against public policy
under former O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2,4 0 which was in effect when the contract
was signed in 2001.41
The court of appeals reversed.4 2 The court reasoned that "[nlo
statute prohibits a professional architect from contracting with a
developer to limit the architect's liability to that developer."4 3 It
rejected the developer's contention that former O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b)
applied to the damages limitation and stated that the statute applied
only to "'an indemnification or hold harmless provision.'""
V.

INDEMNITIES

In Lanier at McEver, L.P v. Planners & Engineers Collaborative,
Inc.," the developer (Lanier) claimed that an engineering firm (PEC)
negligently designed a storm-water drainage system for an apartment
complex.48 The engineering firm moved for partial summary judgment
on the claims of the developer based on a damages limitation clause that
stated:
In recognition of the relative risks and benefits of the project both to
[Lanier] and [PEC], the risks have been allocated such that [Lanier]

38. Id.
39. 298 Ga. App. 78, 679 S.E.2d 43 (2009).
40. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2 (1982 & Supp. 2001) (amended 2007).
41. Precision Planning,298 Ga. App. at 78-79, 679 S.E.2d at 45.

42. Id. at 78, 679 S.E.2d at 45.
43. Id. at 80, 679 S.E.2d at 46.
44. Id. (quoting Brainard v. McKinney, 220 Ga. App. 329, 330, 469 S.E.2d 441, 442

(1996)).
45.

284 Ga. 204, 663 S.E.2d 240 (2008).

46. Id. at 204, 663 S.E.2d at 241.
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agrees, to the fullest extent permitted by law, to limit the liability of
[PEC] and its sub-consultants to [Lanier] and to all construction
contractors and subcontractors on the project or any third parties for
any and all claims, losses, costs, damages of any nature whatsoever[,]
or claims expenses from any cause or causes, including attorneys' fees
and costs and expert witness fees and costs, so that the total aggregate
liability of PEC and its subconsultants to all those named shall not
exceed PEC's total fee for services rendered on this project. It is
intended that this limitation apply to any and all liability or cause of
action however alleged or arising, unless otherwise prohibited by
law.47
The developer contended that the damages limitation was unenforceable
because it violated the prohibition in former O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b)48
against provisions indemnifying a party to a construction contract from
liability for its sole negligence.49
On appeal, the Georgia Supreme Court agreed with the developer,
reasoning that the clause impermissibly indemnified the engineering
firm for all claims-particularly those by members of the public-above
the amount of its fee, even if the engineering firm was solely negligent. 50
VI.

LIQUIDATED DAMAGES

Various forms of liquidated damages clauses appear in constructionrelated agreements. In Fuqua Construction Co. v. PillarDevelopment,
Inc.,5" which involved a real estate sales contract, the Georgia Court of
Appeals focused on two prongs of the Georgia Supreme Court's threepart test governing the enforceability of liquidated damages provisions.
This test was announced in SoutheasternLand Fund,Inc. v. Real Estate
World, Inc.5 2 One prong is whether the damages caused by the breach
were difficult or impossible to accurately estimate.5 3 Another prong is
whether the stipulated sum was a reasonable pre-estimate of the
probable loss.'
The liquidated damages provision in Fuqua Construction was a
standard provision that covered each of the three prongs of the

47. Id. at 205, 663 S.E.2d at 241-42 (alterations in original).
48. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(b) (1982 & Supp. 2001) (amended 2007).
49. Lanier, 284 Ga. at 205, 663 S.E.2d at 242.

50. Id. at 208, 663 S.E.2d at 243-44.
51.

293 Ga. App. 462, 667 S.E.2d 633 (2008).

52. 237 Ga. 227, 230, 227 S.E.2d 340, 343 (1976).
53. Fuqua Constr., 293 Ga. App. at 463, 667 S.E.2d at 635.
54. Id.
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Southeastern test.55 The buyers argued, however, that there was no
evidence the parties had actually considered whether the damages
caused by the breach were difficult or impossible to accurately estimate
or whether the stipulated sum was a reasonable pre-estimate of the
probable loss.56 They also filed affidavits stating that no such consideration had occurred.5 7
As legal support for the significance of these facts, the buyers relied
in part on Roswell Properties, Inc. v. Salle, 8 in which the Georgia
Court of Appeals noted the absence of evidence that the parties had
actually considered the difficulty of determining damages or the probable
loss as reasons the liquidated damages provision was unenforceable. 9
The court in Fuqua Constructiondisagreed that no such evidence existed
in the record before it.' The court cited the terms of the standard
liquidated damages provision itself as such evidence.6 1 It also noted
that the parties were experienced real estate developers and builders6 2
and that the liquidated damages were only 2.06% of the transaction
price.63
In a nutshell, Fuqua Construction can be cited for the position that if
the parties use boilerplate language covering each prong of the
SoutheasternLand Fund test and the court believes the damages were
in fact difficult to estimate and the stipulated sum was a reasonable preestimate of those damages, then the court should enforce the liquidated
damages provision as a matter of law.' The court should enforce the
provision even if the parties did not actually consider whether the
damages would be estimated without difficulty and did not actually
consider the probable loss in the event of a breach.'
VII. CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION STANDING
In Phoenix on PeachtreeCondominium Ass'n v. Phoenix on Peachtree,
LLC,"6 a condominium association sued the condominium's developer
and others, alleging fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

See id. at 465, 667 S.E.2d at 636-37.
Id. at 464, 667 S.E.2d at 635.
Id. at 465-66, 667 S.E.2d at 637.
208 Ga. App. 202, 430 S.E.2d 404 (1993).
Id. at 206, 430 S.E.2d at 409-10.
293 Ga. App. at 464-65, 667 S.E.2d at 636.
Id.
Id. at 464, 667 S.E.2d at 635.
Id. at 465, 667 S.E.2d at 636.
See id. at 465-66, 667 S.E.2d at 636-37.
See id. at 464-65, 667 S.E.2d at 636.
294 Ga. App. 447, 669 S.E.2d 229 (2008).
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duty67 relating to alleged construction defects in the condominium's
common areas.6 The trial court granted summary judgment to the
defendants because the association lacked standing6 9 based on the
following language in the original recorded condominium declaration:
All owners hereby acknowledge and agree that the Association shall
not be entitled to institute any legal action against anyone on behalf
of any or all of the owners which is based on any alleged defect in any
unit or the common elements, or any damage allegedly sustained by
any owner by reason thereof, but rather, that all such actions shall be
instituted by the person(s) owning such units or served by such
common elements or allegedly sustained such damage. 0
On appeal, the association argued that this provision of the original
declaration did not apply because it had been removed by amendment
after the suit was filed. 71 The Georgia Court of Appeals rejected that
argument, noting that standing is determined at the time a suit is
filed. 2
In the alternative, the association argued that the original declaration
provision did not apply to the association's claims for fraud, misrepresentation, and breach of fiduciary duty.73 The court of appeals also
rejected this argument, noting that the provision covered all claims
based upon defects in the condominium's common areas.'
The association's final argument was that summary judgment should
not have been granted until the trial court had ruled on the alternative
motion to substitute the unit owners as plaintiffs,75 which had been
pending for nearly a year before the trial court granted summary
judgment. 76 The court of appeals agreed with this contention and
remanded the case to the trial court for consideration of the motion to
substitute. 7 It also held that the trial court's order granting summary
judgment should be treated as a dismissal because standing does not go
to the merits of the case.78

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id. at 450, 669 S.E.2d at 232.
Id. at 447, 669 S.E.2d at 230.
Id.
Id. at 451, 669 S.E.2d at 232.
Id. at 450, 669 S.E.2d at 232.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 451, 669 S.E.2d at 232.
Id.
See id. at 449-50, 669 S.E.2d at 231.
Id. at 451, 669 S.E.2d at 232.
Id. at 451 n.4, 669 S.E.2d at 232 n.4.
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VIII.

MEASURE OF DAMAGES

The specific issue on which the Georgia Supreme Court granted
certiorari in John Thurmond & Associates, Inc. v. Kennedy79 was
"whether a plaintiff in a breach of contract and negligent construction
case must prove fair market value of the property as a prerequisite to
any recovery" against the contractor.' The case involved claims by a
homeowner against a contractor (JTA) for breach of contract, breach of
warranty, and negligent construction relating to the repair of a house
that was substantially damaged by fire. The contract price for the
repairs was $311,156. At trial, the homeowner sought $751,632 (about
two and one-half times the contract price) for the costs of repairing the
allegedly faulty construction."1
In a somewhat confusing opinion that appears to be aimed at
eliminating confusion arising from prior opinions, the supreme court
concluded that a plaintiff in a breach of contract and negligent
construction case is not necessarily required to prove fair market value
of the property as a prerequisite to a recovery against the contractor. 2
The court recognized that when repair costs are disproportionate to the
reduction in value of property, proof of reduction in fair market value
may be necessary,8 and the supreme court appears to leave the
determination of proportionality up to the trial court.'
IX. ARBrIRATION
The developer and contractor in Tillman Park, LLC v. Dabbs-Williams
General Contractors,LLC 5 had executed the 1997 edition of a standard-form American Institute of Architects agreement. The agreement
incorporated general conditions that required a decision by the architect
as a condition precedent to mediation, arbitration, or litigation, unless
the architect had failed to render a decision for thirty days after referral
of the claim. In the space for identifying the architect on the first page
of the agreement, "N/A" had been typed.'
After disputes arose, the contractor sued the developer, who in turn
counterclaimed against the contractor and filed a motion to compel

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

284 Ga. 469, 668 S.E.2d 666 (2008).
Id. at 469, 668 S.E.2d at 667.
Id.
See id. at 474, 668 S.E.2d at 671.
Id. at 471, 668 S.E.2d at 669.
See id. at 471 n.3, 668 S.E.2d at 669 n.3.
298 Ga. App. 27, 679 S.E.2d 67 (2009).
Id. at 28, 679 S.E.2d at 69.
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arbitration under the agreement. The contractor opposed that motion,
arguing in part that the arbitration clause was unenforceable because
submission of the dispute to an architect was a condition precedent to
arbitration and no architect had been named in the agreement. The
trial court agreed with the contractor and denied the developer's motion
to compel arbitration.87
The Georgia Court of Appeals reasoned that ambiguity existed because
the agreement described various roles for the architect but did not
identify one." Because of this ambiguity, the court of appeals said the
trial court was permitted to consider parol evidence about the parties'
intentions to be bound by the arbitration provision under these
circumstances.8 9 It remanded the case for the trial court to determine
whether the parties intended the arbitration provision to apply despite
the absence of an identified architect.'
The subcontractor in Airtab, Inc. v. Limbach Co.9 was not pleased
with an arbitration award. When the adverse party-the contractor-sought to confirm the award, the subcontractor filed a motion to
vacate the award, alleging that the arbitrators had been biased;
disregarded the law; overstepped their authority;9 2 and had issued an
award that was irrational, arbitrary, and capricious.93 The trial court
denied the motion to vacate and confirmed the award.94
The court of appeals began by noting that, unless an arbitration award
is subject to being vacated under one of the five statutory grounds in
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b),95 the award must be confirmed. 96 The court then
stated that none of the three statutory grounds alleged by the subcontractor were supported by the evidence-namely, bias,97 manifest
disregard of the law, 98 and overstepping authority.'
Aggressive questioning by one of the members of the arbitration panel
was not enough to establish bias."°° Manifest disregard of the law,

87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

Id. at 27-28, 679 S.E.2d at 68-69.
Id. at 32, 679 S.E.2d at 71-72.
Id., 679 S.E.2d at 72.
Id. at 32-33, 679 S.E.2d at 72.
295 Ga. App. 720, 673 S.E.2d 69 (2009).
Id. at 720, 673 S.E.2d at 71.
Id. at 722, 673 S.E.2d at 72.
Id. at 720, 673 S.E.2d at 71.
O.C.G.A. § 9-9-13(b) (2007).
Airtab, 295 Ga. App. at 721, 673 S.E.2d at 71.
Id., 673 S.E.2d at 72.
Id. at 722, 673 S.E.2d at 72.

99.

Id.

100. Id. at 721, 673 S.E.2d at 72.
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which requires proof that the arbitration panel knew the applicable law
and deliberately ignored it, also was not shown.1"' Manifest disregard
of the law is not "the equivalent of" and is a "much narrower standard"
than "insufficiency of the evidence or a misapplication of the law to the
facts." °2 There was also no evidence that the panel overstepped its
authority, which would mean that it had addressed issues not properly
before it. °3 Finally, the court rejected the subcontractor's assertion
that the allegedly irrational, arbitrary, and capricious nature of the
award was a basis for vacating the award."° The court equated this
assertion to an insufficiency of evidence argument and noted that
insufficiency of evidence was not among the five statutory grounds for
vacating an arbitration award. 0 5
X.

MINIMUM RESIDENTIAL WARRANTY

In 2004 the Georgia General Assembly adopted a comprehensive
residential and general contractor licensing law, which, after several
delays, became effective on July 1, 2008.'06 The new law includes a
minimum mandatory warranty requirement in O.C.G.A. § 43-41-7,°7
which states:
A licensed residential contractor and any affiliated entities shall offer
a written warranty in connection with each contract to construct, or
superintend or manage the construction of, any single family residence
where the total value of the work or activity or the compensation to be
received by the contractor for such activity or work exceeds $2,500.00.
The residential contractor division shall establish the minimum
requirements of such warranty.' 8
In 2005 the residential contractor division adopted a very general
regulation establishing the minimum requirements of this warranty.1' 9
But as of August 4, 2008, new and more detailed warranty minimum
requirements apply.'1 0 The new regulation clarifies the meaning of
"single family residence" as used in O.C.G.A. § 43-41-7 by defining it as

101. Id. at 722, 673 S.E.2d at 72.
102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Johnson Real Estate Invs. v. Aqua
Indus., 282 Ga. App. 638, 640, 639 S.E.2d 589, 593 (2006)).

103. Id.
104. Id. at 722-23, 673 S.E.2d at 73.

105. Id. at 722, 673 S.E.2d at 72-73.
106. 2004 Ga. Laws 786 (codified as amended at O.C.G.A. §§ 43-41-1 to -17 (2008)).
107. O.C.G.A. § 43-41-7 (2008).

108. Id.
109. See GA. COMP. R. & REGS. § 553-7-.01 (2006) (repealed 2008).
110. See GA. CoMP. R. & REGS. § 553-7-.01 (2008).
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"a 'one or two family residence' as defined in the current edition of the
state minimum standard International Residential Code (IRC)."'
Under the new regulation, the warranty must at least describe the
following:
Covered work and activities;
(a)
(b)
Covered exclusions;
(c)
Standards for evaluating work and activities, which standards
shall be those set forth in the current edition of the Residential
Construction Performance Guidelines as published by the National
Association of Home Builders;
The term of the warranty, including commencement date(s) or
(d)
event(s);
(e)
Claim procedures;
(f)
Contractor response options (such as repair, replace or compensate); [and]
(g)
Assignable manufacturer warranties." 2
The new regulation focuses more on disclosure than on content. Under
the regulation, a contractor can still decide what is covered and what is
excluded. 1 3 While the standards for evaluating the work have been
clarified (that is, the Residential Construction Performance Guidelines
as published by the National Association of Home Builders), those
standards apply only to covered work that is not excluded."'
The new regulation also requires the contractor to attach "a complete
copy of the written warranty (or an identical blank standard form of it)"
to the underlying contract or otherwise make it available for review prior
to the execution of the underlying contract." 5
The regulation itself does not address the consequences of a residential
contractor's failure to comply with this regulation or create a comprehensive default warranty in the event of noncompliance."'
XI.

CONTRACTOR INACTIVE STATUS LICENSES

According to a new regulation, a contractor that is inactive (by choice
or reality) can now get an inactive contractor's license," 7 which
partially excuses the contractor from educational requirements and fees

111. Id. § 553-7-.01(1)(b).
112. Id. § 553-7-.01(3Xa)-(g).
113. See id. § 553-7-.01(3Xa)-(b).
114. See id. § 553-7-.01(3Xa)-(c).
115. Id. § 553-7-.01(4).

116. See id. § 553-7-.01.
117. GA. CoMP. R. & REGS. § 553-10-.01 (2008).
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during the period of inactivity.118 The application for the inactive
license must be submitted prior to the revocation of the contractor's
license for non-renewal and must include specific information set forth
in the subject regulations. 9 Significantly, a contractor with an
inactive license is not permitted to engage in contracting.12 ° To do so
would be a violation of the contractor licensing law. 21 If a contractor
with an inactive license wishes to return to active status, the contractor
must submit specified information to the contractor licensing board.'2 2
When a contractor has continuously been on inactive status for more
than five years, the licensing board may require that the contractor pass
an exam before obtaining an active license. 23
XII.

CONCLUSION

The period covered by this Article, June 1, 2008 to May 31, 2009, has
been a relatively calm time for Georgia construction law. With
contractor licensing having become effective on July 1, 2008, and the
revisions to Georgia's mechanics' and materialmen's lien laws having
become effective on March 31, 2009, new Georgia appellate cases
applying those laws should start appearing next year.
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